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Abstract: This paper looks at several key motivations behind the prisoner of 
time objection and a view against which it is leveled, the Oxford School of 
divine temporality, with respect to the Christian God. Shared between these 
opposing views are concerns for divine freedom and sovereignty. While the 
objection, coming from divine atemporalists, has in its background a concern 
for the creator–creature distinction, the Oxford School prizes the authenticity 
of temporal God–talk in the Scriptures and the coherency of human God–talk 
more generally. By following these motivations closely in conversation with 
M–theory discussions about the nature of time as a dimension of spacetime, 
I propose a new model of God’s relation to time called transcendent 
temporality. In it, God is transcendently present in our temporal dimension, 
so that he is temporal but experiences our time differently than we do. 
Moreover, God has his own time which is distinct from but correlated to our 
time. God, on this view, is temporal, but in a way that he can experience 
succession in different ways than our one–directional and linear experience 
of succession. I conclude by unpacking some implications of this model and 
addressing possible objections. 
 





The coherence of the Christian faith, with respect to God’s relationship to a temporal 
world, has had a plethora of approaches. These approaches can generally be put into 
one of two categories: divine temporality and atemporality. In the first, God exists 
and operates exclusively within time. This means that God has succession and 




change in his life. Time is, at least within the Oxford school of divine temporality 
(hereafter OSDT), an essential part or “necessary concomitant of his being.” (Mullins 
2014, 165) Alternatively, those who argue for the timelessness of the Christian God 
maintain that God must be outside of time to prevent Him from being confused with 
or a part of the created order. Thus, God would not experience change (even 
potential change) or succession in his life. As accounts of divine temporality, such 
as OSDT, have risen in popularity, objections have come from divine atemporalists. 
One interesting objection is the “prisoner of time” objection (hereafter POT). This 
objection states that divine temporality makes God out to be trapped in creaturely 
time, so that his sovereignty and freedom are limited by time. Because those who 
proffer this objection and the defenders of OSDT are operating with different 
metaphysics of time, metaphysics cannot offer a basis for adjudicating this conflict. 
Rather than starting with a given metaphysic to then build a model of God’s 
relationship to time, a model will be offered in this article which can capture and 
account for various motivations and intuitions behind OSDT accounts as well the 
accounts which proffer this POT objection. Because this article will focus on offering 
a model which can capture theological and philosophical motivations from both 
sides of the debate, there will not be space to assess which metaphysic of time would 
best fit this model. However, there will certainly be implications from this model 
which will hopefully aid in choosing a helpful metaphysic for this model in future 
work. This approach, I believe, can offer a potential way forward in the impasse 
between at least one version of divine temporality and the general intuitions which 
drive many divine atemporalists. In critical engagement with this objection and 
OSDT responses to it, I will offer a model of God’s relation to spacetime in 
conversation with M–theory, a theory of quantum physics that unifies the consistent 
versions of string–theory, which itself explains particles and fundamental forces in 
models of vibrating strings.  
I begin by laying out cases made for divine atemporality and OSDT with respect 
to the POT objection. I will identify two shared motivations and one motivation 
unique to each side of the debate. These motivations are theologically significant and 
provide a basis for mediating the disagreement. Then, by resourcing M–theory 
models of dimensional spacetime, I provide further content and structure for 
understanding time. These models are trans–dimensional, showing analogous 
relationship between higher and lower dimensions of space and time. On this basis 
I will propose a new model of God’s relation to time, one in which God 
transcendently is temporal, occupying but not being limited to creaturely time. This 
model will be shown to better capture the shared and distinct motivations behind 





1. Divine Atemporality, Temporality and the POT Objection 
 
Between OSDT and the POT objection, time has been generally described as 
potential change or succession.1 In the POT objection, divine atemporalists object 
that divine temporality puts God under the “rule” of time, the same as any other 
creature of his created order. God is a prisoner of time, in such a construal, because 
he is necessarily subject to it, existing temporally by his very nature and unable to 
exist without succession. Such a construal of God’s relationship to time, for 
atemporalists, puts into question God’s divine sovereignty and freedom. Mullins 
summarizes the objection like this:  
 
God, prior to the act of creation, exists in an unmetricated time. God’s life is one 
conscious mental event without any intrinsic change. However, when God chooses 
to create He breaks this changeless event and becomes—gasp—a prisoner of time! 
He can no longer go back to the prior state because He is now enmeshed in the 
relentless flow of time where His life is stretched out with segments of it lost in the 
irretrievable past. (Mullins 2014, 167) 
 
It is important to note exactly what is meant when the POT objection is leveled. I 
take there to be two key elements to this objection. God, according to OSDT, exists 
prior to creation in unmetricated succession, being without measurable intrinsic 
change in his life. (Zimmerman 2002, 83–84) God is in a state of unmetricated 
temporality, having a specific relationship to time in which intrinsic change and 
succession are merely potential. God then freely acts to create the world, becoming 
necessarily trapped in another state with a more immanent relationship to time, so 
that his life takes on metricated succession and actual intrinsic change. Metrication 
is the measurability of the change in God’s life, so that one moment can be 
distinguished from the next in virtue of the temporal change. God is unable to 
return to the first state and relate to time as he once did. Moreover, time appears to 
function here, even as a necessary concomitant of God’s being, as a separate entity 
from God. If this is the case, there is something which is not God to which God is 
subject. God necessarily takes on temporal change and succession when creating 
and cannot do otherwise, challenging God’s sovereignty over that entity of time. 
 
1 While divine temporalists and atemporalists agree that God has no beginning or end, there is 
disagreement on whether God has potential change or succession in his life. It is in virtue of this 
succession that God would have temporal location or extension. That it is metricated means time is 
measurable in concrete terms. (Mullins 2014, 162–164) 




While many cases have been made against OSDT which claim that it is incoherent, 
this particular objection is rather made with concern for the conceptual costs of 
holding a coherent OSDT account. (Weinandy 2009 and Long 2009)2 The question 
remains as to whether this is something OSDT is truly guilty of, or if there is perhaps 
a way forward in holding to God’s temporality while giving proper credence to 
these theologically rooted concerns.  
 
The Case for the Timeless God 
 
To answer this question, it would serve us best to lay out some key concerns 
motivating POT objections and do the same of OSDT. This will ensure that the 
parties involved are not talking past each other. The POT objection has at its heart 
two key theological concerns. Helm’s version of the POT objection takes divine 
temporality to be “incompatible with divine sovereignty, divine perfection, and 
with that fullness of being that is essential to God.” (Helm 2002, 122) Elsewhere, 
Helm argues that divine sovereignty is impossible for a God whose freedom is 
restricted by time and space. (Helm 1988, 112) Underneath the concern for divine 
sovereignty is a deeper concern more widely shared by divine atemporalists for 
divine freedom. Brian Leftow, for instance, argues that divine timelessness does not 
restrict human freedom, operating with a different understanding of sovereignty 
than Helm, but still resting the defense of that sovereignty on divine freedom. 
(Leftow 2018, 250–251) Leftow’s argument further does not seem to hinge upon 
divine sovereignty as Helm’s does, but he goes to great lengths to defend divine 
freedom in a way consistent with Helm’s deeper concerns. (Leftow 218, 301)  
Yet even with this point of divine freedom distinguished from the concern for 
sovereignty, there still exists a broader concern for divine sovereignty. This indicates 
that there are further concerns beyond divine freedom motivating divine 
atemporality. While the sovereignty defense is usually tied to the position that time 
is a created entity, it is not exclusive to it. The existence of time as a created entity is 
rejected by many OSDT accounts. Yet the creation of time and divine lordship over 
time are not the same. All that needs to be said of time for it to be a thing which is 
subject to God’s lordship is that God determines its order.  
Another way of putting this is to say that God is ontologically responsible for the 
ordering of a thing, so that God makes a thing what it essentially is according to his 
will. This is at the root of the sovereignty argument, which takes any sense of time 
 
2 These two scholars proffer the view that OSDT is incoherent on the assumption that time is part 
of the created order. In Mullins’ defense of OSDT, he simply eschews this claim, stating that time is 




which is not determined by God as something which therefore imposes upon God’s 
ability to determine created order. (Helm 2002, 120–123) This is true even for 
something which is traditionally thought to be ordered necessarily in 
correspondence to the order of God’s own being, such as the imago Dei in human 
persons. (Gunton 1991, 61) Human creatures are not God, being distinct from him 
as members of the created order, and yet are ordered necessarily in a way that 
reflects God’s own personal being. Even as we would say this, we would not say 
that this ordering of human beings is something to which God is subjected, but 
rather that God determines humanity to be what it is essentially. Underneath the 
sovereignty concern, therefore, is a concern for this distinction of creator and 
creature. It is by his lordship that we are ordered in a way that corresponds to God’s 
personal being. Even if we are to say that God necessarily orders creation temporally 
because he is temporal in himself, we still must understand that ordering activity as 
God’s lordship over time and not as something to which he is subject. There must 
be a creator–creature distinction between how God relates to the temporal ordering 
of creation as its determiner and how creatures relate to it. 
 
Response from the Oxford School of Divine Temporality 
 
There have been several responses to this objection returning from the OSDT. Setting 
aside the objections of internal incoherency, which have been left on the cutting 
room floor by those such as Mullins and Padgett willing to bite the bullet on time 
having no beginning, we are left with objections which see divine temporality as a 
threat to God’s divine freedom and lordship over temporal order. (Mullins 2014, 
166) Mullins’ response focuses on how we understand properly God’s sovereignty 
and the fullness of his divine life as a temporal being. (Mullins 2014, 166) Common 
themes are found throughout OSDT responses which motivate the necessity of 
God’s temporality. I will focus on what I take to be three key motivations among 
these themes: the authenticity and coherency of God’s engagement with a spatio–
temporal world through temporal actions, the coherency of our temporal talk about 
God’s life, and the necessity of God instituting temporal order in his act of creation. 
The first motivation is more of a surface observation. OSDT attempts to take 
seriously the temporal nature of God–talk in the Scriptures, especially narratival 
sections which appear at face value to depict God changing his mind, (Gen 18:16–




33)3 God experiencing and acting in a temporal event, (Gen 1)4 or God speaking 
about succession in his own life. (John 8:48–59)5 Even advocates of OSDT readily 
admit that there is nothing in the text that necessitates one take a particular view on 
the philosophy of time; the Scriptures simply aren’t clear on what time is and how 
God relates to it.6 It is my intuition that these sorts of readings of temporal language 
in Scripture hope to take seriously and plainly the narrative of Scripture and the 
authenticity of the temporal God–talk that it offers. Even if one were to find in the 
philosophy of time the most air–tight argument for a timeless God, the sheer volume 
of temporal language predicated of God in the Scriptures cannot be so easily set 
aside. The authenticity and coherency of biblical God–talk further begs the question 
of our own God–talk. 
I see this as the second motivation behind OSDT. One might be able to excuse 
temporal God–talk repeated verbatim from the Scriptures because it holds a certain 
authority and replicability in Christian theology despite the involvement of human 
language and human authors. (2 Tim 3:16–17) Yet one could excuse Scriptural 
references to divine temporality while still problematizing the authenticity of our 
own contemporary God–talk put into temporal terms. This is to ask, “how authentic 
and coherent can our God–talk be if we are merely temporal beings speaking of an 
atemporal God?” If we are to be able to make any claims about God with respect to 
time, there would need to be some assumptions about an analogous relationship 
between God’s experience of time and our own. This is problematized in 
atemporalist construals of God’s relationship to a temporal world, as Mullins points 
out, because accounts which relate a timeless God to temporal objects come up either 
 
3 God initially pronounces judgement on Sodom, and then proceeds through a successive 
discussion with Abraham, with each stage of the discussion consisting of a new judgement of God as 
to how he will treat Sodom in light of Abraham’s most recent plea. 
4 God acts in succession here, creating some different aspect of the cosmos each successive day 
and resting on the seventh day. 
5 Even in a merely relative sense, the God–human speaks of his pre–incarnate self as being 
temporally prior to Abraham, thus implying some kind of temporal self–understanding of God’s own 
being in relation to his creatures. 
6 Leftow argues for the eternality of God, but demonstrates how this concept has a very specific 
and minimal definition which includes “no claim about time’s nature or structure.” This is especially 
true of the Hebrew Bible/OT, where most of the apparent conflicts with atemporality are found. Any 
view one takes, Leftow goes on to demonstrate, requires some philosophical and/or theological 
interpretation in addition to the bald content of Scripture. (Leftow 2005, 51) A similar conclusion is 
made by Gershom Brin. He perceives eternity in rather minimal terms which, at least at first glance, 




incoherent or obscure on how this relation actually works.7 At stake, then, is the 
authenticity of the God–world relation which seems to be assumed by the Christian 
theological task of knowing and praising a God who loves and is present in a spatio–
temporal world. 
This second motivation behind OSDT is answered by the third; that time is God’s 
way of instituting his order on creation so we, his creatures, might make sense of it. 
T. F. Torrance writes, 
 
Since the whole realm of space and time is maintained by God as the object of His 
creative knowledge and power, space and time are to be conceived as a continuum 
of relations given in and with created existence and as the bearers of its immanent 
order. Apart from space and time nature would be indeterminable and 
unintelligible, for it would have no sequences or patterns of change and no series of 
continuous coherent structures and would thus be incapable of any kind of 
meaningful formalization. It is to space and time, therefore, that we have to look for 
the determinate and intelligible medium within which God makes Himself present 
and known to us and within which our knowledge of Him may be formed and 
grounded objectively in God’s own transcendent rationality. (Torrance 1997, 61) 
 
Such is the role of temporality in OSDT’s conception of God’s creative action. This 
is similar to the sovereignty claim of divine atemporalists. God must be, according 
to this motivation, ontologically responsible for time, making it fundamentally what 
it is. (Padgett 1989, 209) God chooses this freely in choosing to create, determining 
the temporal and spatial ordering of creation. Therefore, the concerns for divine 
freedom and lordship over time held by atemporalists are shared by OSDT. (Padgett 
2003, 129) Here in we find at least some common ground by which to proceed 
between these conflicting views. From here, we might press forward towards 
maintaining the authenticity of Scriptural God–talk as well as our own temporal talk 
about an eternal God amidst the creator–creature distinction. 
 
 
7 Mullins has in mind four–dimensional eternalism and ET–simultaneity. (Mullins 2014, 174ff) The 
former is championed by scholars such as Katherin Rogers, T.J. Mawson, and Don Lodzinski. Mullins 
goes on to demonstrate the conceptual costs of this view, which has differing assumptions about the 
metaphysics of time to begin with. ET–simultaneity comes from a paper by Eleanor Stump and 
Norman Kretzmann, which contends that God is atemporal in his being but is able to be present at 
temporal events with temporal beings. (Stump and Kretzmann, 1981) Mullins argues that this model 
is obscure as to how this is metaphysically possible and so is not particularly helpful for explaining 
God’s relation to time. While the model in this paper does proffer that God is both in and beyond our 
time like ET–simultaneity, I will show below that it does so in a very different way than Stump’s and 
Kretzmann’s model. 




2. Trans–Dimensional Models of Time and Space 
 
OSDT seems to be at an impasse with its divine atemporalist critics. While this may 
be the case, I do not think that the key concerns motivating the POT objection and 
the responses to it are mutually exclusive. We require, however, a logical model 
which can sustain these motivations. Moreover, it would be helpful to have more 
content about the nature and structure of time to appeal to as a way of mitigating 
some of the key disagreements between the two camps. The ways in which M–
theory relates time and space can offer us helpful tools for logically and 
metaphysically modeling God’s relationship to time, as well as provide helpful 
content for talking about what time is and how it is structured in relation to other 
cosmic realities.  
 
Dimensions of Spacetime in M–Theory 
 
M–theory has a particular understanding of time as a dimension much like three–
dimensional space (or three space). In point of fact, time has been considered unified 
as a dimension of existence with dimensional space since the work of Minkowski. 
(Horwitz 2005, 2) M–theory dimensions are those metricated ways in which objects 
occupy spatial or temporal existence. This is understood in a way which warrants 
analogical talk between spatial and temporal dimensions. According to M–theory, 
there are ten spatial dimensions and at least one temporal dimension. (Greene 2011, 
203) Spatial and temporal dimensions are analogous to one another in a way similar 
to how our typical three dimensions of space are analogous to one another. Greene 
gives the example of an object’s speed through spatial and temporal dimensions, 
writing, “since this view proclaims that space and time are simply different 
examples of dimensions, [we can] speak of an object’s speed through time in a 
manner resembling the concept of its speed through space.” (Greene 2011, 50) He 
goes on to show how each dimension, including time, provides a different 
independent metric for measuring an objects speed, but that in fact each dimension 
does measure the same aspect in ways analogous to the other independent metrics.  
It is for this reason that equations like the Minkowski equations for points in n 
dimensions always have a time metric by which they are also measured.8 The way 
this is noted, so that time and space are united but measured in distinct ways is 
 
8 Minkowski space is represented with the formulation Mn+1 where n is the number of spatial 
dimensions and 1 stands for the time dimension. This assumption of the temporality of space has 





significant. I am not the first to attempt to make claims about God’s relation to time 
by drawing on this analogy between space and time. However, many of these other 
accounts treat this temporal dimension as functionally equivalent to a higher spatial 
dimension rather than treating it as functioning as a separate but analogous set of 
dimensions.9 Rather than treating time as a higher dimension which transcends 
three–space, I will show how, per Minkowski space, an object that can transcend our 
dimension of time could exist or be present temporally in a non–reductive way 
similar to how objects with higher dimensions of space can exist non–reductively in 
lower dimensions of space. In other words, temporal dimensions relate to one 
another in a way analogous to how spatial dimensions relate to one another. Because 
time and space are united in this way, we can likely say similar things on this model 
about God’s presence in time as we can about God’s presence in space. However, 
due to the spatial constraints of this paper (pun intended), the exploration of God’s 
transcendent spatial existence will need to be saved for future work.  
As will be shown throughout the paper, this understanding of Minkowski space 
allows for a more nuanced approach to the analogies between space and time. The 
analogy between dimensions is thus described as independent directions of 
measurable space and time. (Greene 2011, 202) The relationship between spacetime 
dimensions is therefore analogous to the extent that one can measure a given object 
according to that dimension. 
This does not, however, mean that every object is measurable in every dimension. 
Indeed, many of the extra dimensions in M–theory are compactified, which is 
generally taken to mean that a given extra dimension of space (beyond the three 
“common” spatial dimensions) is curled up to fit within a small radius. (McMahon 
2009, 153–154) This means that there could be small “pocket” dimensions of space 
which fits within three space. These dimensions could overlap, intersect, or run 
completely parallel to one another. It has also been theorized that the three common 
 
9 This includes if we think of temporal dimensions as a set of one. Linda Zagzebski is one example 
of someone drawing in the spatial analogy. (Zagzebski 1992, 172–179) Similar to the below treatment 
Abbot’s Flatland, Zagzebski draws on the analogy between temporal existence and spatial existence, 
treating time as a fourth dimension that is directly analogous to the common three dimensions of 
space. In this account, God is a four–dimensional object that occupies but is not limited to three–
dimensional space. While the relation between higher and lower dimensions is properly captured in 
this account, time is treated functionally as if it were a higher dimension of space as opposed to being 
treated as a set of dimensions that relate to one another in a way analogous to the way spatial 
dimensions relate to one another. Stump and Kretzmann make similarly analogous claims between 
time and space. (Stump and Kretzmann 1981) Abbot’s work is similarly drawn on in their ET–
simultaneity account. Further distinctions between their work and the present article are discussed 
below. 




spatial dimensions could just as easily exist within larger spatial dimensions. 
(Horwitz 2005, 3) 
As a final comment on the nature of time in M–theory, not every advocate of the 
theory agrees that there is a single time dimension. Some have speculated that there 
could also be extra time dimensions. (Greene 2011, 204) Like spatial dimensions, 
these extra time dimensions could be compactified within the “normal” spatial 
dimension or be a temporal dimension which itself contains three space and the 
normal time dimension. Greene theorizes that such extra dimensions would be 
distinguished by how they are experienced, since our ability to distinguish between 
one spatial dimension and another is predicated on our metrication of them. (Greene 
2011, 204–205) He gives the example here of how in a circular and compactified extra 
spatial dimension into which a small ant walks, the ant would walk in a straight 
direction but continue to end up in the same spot as if walking in a circle. The ant’s 
experience of spatial direction in this compactified dimension is different. Likewise, 
Greene speculates that if one were to somehow pass through a compactified extra 
temporal dimension, one would experience the succession of time differently, 
possibly even returning to a previous moment within that temporal dimension. 
(Green 2011, 204–206) Such an extra dimension would be completely beyond our 
current experience of time which, according to both string theorists and OSDT 
advocates, is absolute and one–directional with regard to succession. (Mullins 2014, 
165) By absolute, it is meant that time exists independent of our perception of it and 
proceeds in a consistently metricated way whether or not the change is noticeable. 
In other words, only the potential for change is required to say that time is absolute. 
By one directional, it is meant that the succession of time proceeds from moment t1 
to later moment t2 so that what happens at moment t1 can causally affect what 
happens at t2, but what happens at t2 cannot causally affect what happens at t1. Past 
moments are irretrievable. An extra dimension of time would likely be a different 
experience of temporal change and succession than this experience of  absolute and 
mono–directional time, though one which is metricated in a way analogous to our 
current understanding of time in the same way that extra spatial dimensions are 
metricated in a way analogous to our common understanding of three space.  
 
The Relationship Between 3D and 2D Polytopes 
 
To help illustrate this analogous relationship between extra and common 
dimensions, I will appeal to multiple models of spatial analogy between dimensions. 
The analogous relationship between spatial dimensions will aid us in describing a 




to M–theory. The correlated senses in which each dimension of space is 
independently measurable is modeled with objects called polytopes. These are 
objects which have a corollary object in each measurable dimension of space. An 
example of this is a straight line, a square, and a cube in one, two, and three 
dimensions respectively.  
One way to explain the relationship between correlated polytopes is to imagine 
each shape extended along a new axis of measurement. Each axis by which the object 
is extended represents a new dimension of space which the object occupies so long 
as it is perpendicular to all other axes of spatial measurement. Let us imagine, for 
example, a one–dimensional line which measures, or occupies the one–dimensional 
space of two meters along an x–axis. It is then extended along a perpendicular axis, 
y, by two meters. This creates a two–dimensional object, a square, occupying two 
meters squared of space according to both the x and y axes. If we imagine a third z–
axis which is perpendicular to both the x and y axes, we can extend our square by 
two meters along it to occupy a third dimension of space, and thus to occupy two 
meters cubed of space. This object is called a cube. Each of these three objects 
represents a correlated polytope, representing the same amount of analogous space 
occupied in one, two, and three dimensions. 
While the two–dimensional square can occupy the space of the one–dimensional 
line, it cannot be reduced to the space it occupies in that dimension. Rather, it can be 
said to occupy both the first and second dimensions of space. The same can be said 
of the relationship between third and second–dimensional polytopes. A two–
dimensional square can occupy the entirety of two out of three of the cube’s 
dimensions. Such correlated objects can, in this way, occupy the same space. 
However, it cannot be said that the objects are identical, nor can it be said that they 
occupy identical space. Rather, the square can be said to fit inside of the space of the 
cube. While the space of these two objects are related, even overlapping, they are 
not reducible to each other and are distinguishable by the number of metricated axes 
which determine their space. 
Because of the relationship between these objects, it is possible to model a three–
dimensional object using two–dimensional shapes. The nature of these models, 
rooted in the logic of the relationship between the second and third dimensions, is 
what will help us to explain the relationship between God and time. Returning to 
our example of the square and cube, a model of a cube can be drawn on a two–
dimensional plane using only two–dimensional shapes, including the square. 
Possible ways of modeling the cube in a two–dimensional way are shown in figures 
(a) and (b) below. I am calling this a trans–dimensional model, as it models an object 
of a given dimension in another dimension, transcending our conceptual 




understanding of one dimension with that of another dimension. However, these 
figures can easily be confused for mere two–dimensional shapes. In point of fact, 
they are two–dimensional shapes representing various perspectives of the three–
dimensional cube on a flat page or screen. Figure (b), for instance, appears no 
different than a two–dimensional square despite being an accurate depiction of a 
cube from a certain two–dimensional perspective. 
 
(a) (b)  
 
These representations, furthermore, can be deceiving. For instance, it is possible 
that figure (a) is a two–dimensional square and two parallelograms, but that we are 
assuming that it has three–dimensional depth. Figure (a), as well, could just as easily 
be a cube, having four right angles on each of its planar faces, as it can be a warped 
cube, having four right angles only on two faces. Without more models to confirm 
our two–dimensional perception of this cube, either is possible. Either figure, 
furthermore, could have the same shape as a cube from this perspective, but have a 
distinct shape from a different perspective, as shown in figure (c) below. We can add 




Yet even these more detailed models could be misconstrued. While we can safely 
eliminate misinterpretations of certain aspects like the representational meaning of 
dotted vs. solid lines, with dotted lines being edges behind our two–dimensional 
view of the cube’s faces, there is still the possibility of multiple interpretations of 
each shape. The various vertices could be either concave or convex, or the overall 
shape could, as previously speculated, be warped so that only one face is a true 
square. There is only so much two–dimensional models can do to represent a three–




Now it does not follow these representations are untrue. This only illustrates that 
a two–dimensional model does not have the capacity to capture the fullness of three 
space. Each model can only capture some aspect or perspective of three space. 
Specifically, it can capture two dimensions of three space. To truly confirm this 
polytope through two–dimensional models, we would actually need an infinite 
number of two–dimensional models, having a depth of zero, which bisect the cube 
at an infinite number of points of depth. Imagine slicing the cube along its z–axis an 
infinite number of times, such that we had an infinite number of two–dimensional 
squares which, when stacked together, formed the cube. Both because they are 
infinite and are arranged along an axis which does not exist in two space, we are 
justified in saying that however accurate a two–dimensional model of a three–
dimensional object is, two space can never contain three–dimensional objects. A 
three–dimensional object, however, can occupy two–dimensional space, and can 
thus be said to exist (non–reducibly) two–dimensionally. A similar thought 
experiment could be conducted between the one–dimensional line and the two–
dimensional square. Thus, the point is demonstrated that for any polytope with n 
dimensions, it is possible to make limited yet true models of a corollary polytope 
with (n + 1) dimensions, so that the space which the n polytope occupies is directly 
analogous to the space which the (n + 1) polytope occupies. The (n + 1) polytope 
occupies n dimensions, but not merely n dimensions. 
 
Conceptual Models of Extra–Dimensional Polytopes 
 
The question then must be asked: how far can we build conceptual models of 
dimensions beyond our own spatial existence? This is important if we want to talk 
about the analogy between common and extra dimensions of spacetime. Could we 
make a true yet limited model in three dimensions of an object which is “extra–
dimensional,” having more dimensions than the common three spatial and one 
temporal?10 Here I will offer three such models, each of which will explain a 
significant aspect of trans–dimensional modeling.  
The first conceptual modeling of extra–dimensional polytopes in lower 
dimensions is known as the tesseract or four–dimensional hypercube. While these 
terms are widely recognized for their role in the Marvel Cinematic Universe, these 
properly refer to the four–dimensional polytope corollary of the cube. A hypercube, 
being analogous to a cube in the same way a cube is analogous to a square, is a 
 
10 While some have argued for some extra dimensions to be considered as more common, three 
dimensions of space and one dimension of time are considered “common” broadly in the literature 
on M–theory. 




spatial extension of a cube along a fourth z` axis which is perpendicular to the x, y, 
and z axes described in the previous section. (Gardner 1966, 138–143) As beings 
which spatially exist three dimensionally, we cannot conceive of a fourth direction 
which would be perpendicular to x, y, and z. So, we use two and three–dimensional 
models to demonstrate what a four–dimensional object would look like when 
occupying three space.  
The tesseract was introduced to demonstrate the possibility of a fourth spatial 
dimension. (Krikke 2018, 43) However, because humans are generally thought to 
experience and comprehend only three dimensions of space, this model ended up 
also demonstrating the possibility of both two and three–dimensional models of 
four–dimensional objects. Figures (d)11, (e) 12, and (f)13 below each demonstrate a 




(e)  (f)   
 
In (d) and (e), one can easily see the extension of the cube’s three dimensions of space 
in a fourth direction. However, both show this in a three–dimensional direction that 
is a composite of x and y which merely represents the fourth perpendicular axis z`. 
While (d) shows this in a way similar to our two and three–dimensional modeling 
in the previous section, (e) shows a “folded–up” tesseract, with the z` axis extending 
internally. This is done typically to demonstrate how four space contains three 
 
11 (Wikimedia Commons, n.d.) 
12 (Weisstein, n.d.) 




space, so that the extension would appear to our three–dimensional perception as 
eight cube–like cells folding in on one another. (Weisstein, n.d.) This is shown 
further in (f), where the various cells appear to overlap one another in three space 
despite actually being an externally extended four–dimensional object. (Mason, et 
al, 2) This is not unlike figures (a`) and (b`) where the third dimension of extension 
appears to be internal to or overlap the two dimensions of the square. Mason, et al 
note that any dimensional condescension is necessarily going to lose spatial 
information, thus appearing like the object is in multiple locations in three–space or 
overlapping itself. What these two or three–dimensional models show is not only 
the limitedness of extra–dimensional modeling, but the strangeness to lower 
dimensional experience of those higher dimensional objects. Such objects would 
appear to the three–dimensional observer to overlap, appear multiply–located, or 
even to be partially missing from perspective. Simply put, four–dimensional objects 
are able to occupy three–dimensional space, but in such a way that they would 
experience it differently than three–dimensional objects.14 Likewise, four–
dimensional objects would be experienced in these different ways by three–
dimensional observers. This is because four–dimensional objects are able to 
transcend three space, being able to occupy those three dimensions of space without 
being contained by them. 
Although this relationship between three and four space has been explained 
mathematically and quantum mechanically, probably the most helpful illustrations 
come from the Edwin Abbott’s Flantland and its spiritual successor: the videogame 
Miegakure. (Abbott 2007) In Abbott’s story, there are sentient creatures who dwell in 
Flatland, a two–dimensional plane of existence. A Square travels to Lineland, 
Pointland, and Spaceland, learning how to think about three space as a two–
dimensional object. While his perception of Sphere, a three–dimensional being from 
Spaceland, is a circle expanding and contracting, he comes to understand 
conceptually three space even though it is beyond his own existence. He even goes 
as far as to speculate about the possibility of a fourth dimension beyond Spaceland. 
The upshot of this work’s analogy is that it is possible to conceive of and analogously 
understand dimensional space beyond our own existence by way of spatial 
analogies. Square depicts this possibility thusly:  
 
 
14 It has been theorized that gases would be denser in four dimensions because (as best I can tell) 
of the ways in which gravitational forces act relative to dimensional axes. The gas would expand 
maximally within three space, only to expand “inward” along its fourth axis so that it exists spatially 
more condensed when measured in three dimensions. (Robbin 2008, 26)  




There, before my ravished eye, a Cube moving in some altogether new direction, 
but strictly according to Analogy, so as to make every particle of his interior pass 
through a new kind of Space, with a wake of its own…And once there, shall we stay 
our upward course? In that blessed region of Four Dimensions, shall we linger at 
the threshold of the Fifth, and not therein…Then, yielding to our intellectual onset, 
the gates of the Six Dimension shall fly open; after that a Seventh, and then an 
Eighth… (Abbott 2007, 68) 
They way Abbott lays out the logical framework of these analogies, starting with the 
dimensional condescension of a two–dimensional object and moving up the 
proverbial ladder through our own three–dimensional existence, suggests that we 
can analogously understand an infinite number of higher dimensions in the 
metricated terms of our own dimensional existence. Moreover, objects which occupy 
higher dimensions of existence could easily be perceived in and described according 
to lower dimensions of existence in the way that a three–dimensional object, such as 
a cube, can be modeled accurately in terms of two–dimensional objects. This 
suggests that we can model higher dimensional objects analogously in the terms of 
our own dimensional existence.  
By way of practical illustration, the videogame Miegakure places the player as a 
three–dimensional character navigating four–dimensional worlds. The player in this 
game views their character from the third person perspective as a camera floating 
around the player character. By rotating the camera to different perspectives, the 
shapes of the world warp and change. It is a three–dimensional model of four space, 
not simply of four–dimensional objects. Where one perspective might reveal a 
certain shape to an object, another perspective created by rotating to a new axis 
makes the shape of the object appear to occupy three space differently, such that the 
four–dimensional objects that the player is navigating appear to shift and change 
within three space. This is analogous to how multiple two–dimensional models of a 
cube offer a clearer and fuller picture of the space it occupies. The appearance of 
change is analogous not only the truth of four space, but the ways in three–
dimensional observers experience four–dimensional space, namely that they can 
only experience three of its dimensions at a time. These are not two separate realms 
of existence, as in the analogies of Flatland, but rather these spaces overlap and 
intersect, possibly to the extent that the total space of the third dimension is 
contained inside of a four space.  
These two conceptual models introduce something interesting into our trans–
dimensional modeling, namely the psychological experience of space. The sort of 
awareness of spatial discrepancy and oddness introduced by the 




distinguish dimensions of spatial existence in terms of experience. On these models, 
three–dimensional objects experience four space differently than four–dimensional 
objects. Likewise, as observed in the tesseract model, three–dimensional experience 
of a four–dimensional object would be different than a four–dimensional experience 
of a four–dimensional object.  
The upshot of these trans–dimensional models is that objects with higher 
dimensions of spatial existence can in fact occupy lower dimensions of spatial 
existence. When they do so, they are not reducible to that dimension, but instead can 
be said to transcend that dimension and exist also beyond the lower dimensions. It 
is therefore possible to model objects of higher dimensional existence in a limited 
yet truthful way which does not conceptually reduce the object to the highest 
dimension of the model. In this way, we might think of object a which has more 
dimensions than object b, such that at least one of the dimensions which a has and 
which b does not have are not pocket dimensions. Object a is therefore of higher 
ontological status than b, because it can exist in every dimensional sense that b can. 
However, b cannot exist in every dimensional sense that a can. This argument is 
taken up by Rosen, whose philosophical work on the topology of trans–dimensional 
modeling demonstrates how lower dimensions are transcended by or “nested 
within” higher dimensions. (Rosen 2006, 62–63) Because lower dimensions cannot 
fully contain objects of higher dimensional existence, it bears lower ontological 
status than objects transcending it. Said another way, object a can exist in every way 
that object b can be said to exist, but object b cannot be said to exist in every way 
object a can. Because we are talking specifically about dimensional modes of 
existence, we can talk about this in terms of ontological status so long as we qualify 
ontological status to mean this very minimal definition.15  
Because of the dimensional relationship between space and time assumed by M–
theory, it follows that an object which is of higher ontological status than the 
common dimension of time could in fact transcend time. This means that the given 
object could exist temporally (as we understand time), but could not be reduced to 
common temporal existence. Rather, it would seem that such an object as is capable 
of transcending the common dimension of time could likely exist outside of that 
dimension in addition to existing within it, being located both temporally and extra–
temporally. Whether that existence is one of a higher temporal dimension which 
contains the common one or if it simply is an existence beyond all dimensions of 
 
15 This point could be better supported if there were more space in the article to do so. In lieu of 
that space, I will have to rely on Rosen’s more thorough work on the subject. Let us content ourselves 
to say minimally that object a can exist in every way that b can, but that b cannot exist in every way 
that a can. This ought to be sufficient enough to make the moves I need to with this point. 




time16 requires further input from theology as the object in question here is the 
Trinitarian God of the Christian faith. As our second and third conceptual models 
suggest, such an object would experience the first dimension of time differently than 
we do. We, likewise, would experience the temporality of such an object in odd ways 
which seem to contradict our sense of temporality, but would nonetheless be 
coherent and true. 
 
3. Transcendent Temporality: Towards a Trans–Dimensional Model of God and 
Time 
 
These trans–dimensional models demonstrate how objects with higher dimensions 
of existence, and thus higher ontological status (as defined minimally above), are 
perceived by and modeled in lower dimensions of spatial existence which they 
occupy. Such a relationship can be logically extended to how we think about time as 
a dimension. What these models show is that while objects of higher dimensional 
existence can occupy lowers dimensions of existence, they cannot be wholly 
contained nor fully modeled in these lower dimensions. Rather, they transcend 
lower dimensions of existence, so that higher dimensional objects are able to exist in 
lower dimensions without being reducible to their metrication in those lower 
dimensions. As such, these higher dimensional objects will both experience 
dimensional existence in and be experienced differently by lower dimensions.  
Much like how the four–dimensional tesseract occupies space both within and 
beyond the three–dimensional plane of spatial existence, an object or being of higher 
ontological status than the common dimension of time could exist temporally and 
exist extra–temporally in a mode of existence beyond the common time dimension. 
It is no great leap theologically or philosophically to assume that God is the being 
with the highest ontological status, and so he would be capable of transcending all 
known dimensions. God could be spatio–temporally present at a given spatial and 
temporal point while also transcending or existing outside of that point. This model 
of God’s relationship to spacetime conforms perfectly to neither the so–called 
“prisoner of time” construal held by OSDT nor the atemporalist response to OSDT 
in the POT objection. Rather, a trans–dimensional model of God’s relationship to 
spacetime implies that God could be both within our commonly understood 
 
16 How one construes this depends on whether one takes seriously the possibility of extra time 
dimensions. If one does, than it could simply be said that God exists extra–dimensionally with respect 
to time. Otherwise, one could posit that God’s existence beyond the temporal dimension would 
simply be an unmeasurable existence with respect to his experience of time. Both are possible under 




dimension of time while being temporally extended beyond it. God could 
experience our time while also experiencing dimensional or non–dimensional 
existence beyond our time. This model, I will show, better captures the previously 
demonstrated motivations of divine atemporalists and OSDT. This includes the 
shared motivations of divine freedom and ontological responsibility as well as the 
unshared motivations of the creator–creature distinction, authenticity of the 
temporal God–world relation, and the coherency of temporal God–talk. 
 
Transcendent Temporality and the Prisoner Objection 
What would it mean for God to be transcendently temporal with respect to what we 
experience as the common dimension of time? There are several implications which 
I will unpack here for thinking about God as ontologically higher than the common 
dimension of time in such a way that he transcends it. To help distinguish 
transcendent temporality from the OSDT and atemporalists accounts I’ve described, 
I will focus on the language of experience of time used by Greene in his speculations 
on how extra dimensions of time would be distinct from our common time. 
The first implication is that neither divine atemporalists who proffer the POT 
objection nor the mere temporality proposed by OSDT adequately account for God’s 
higher ontological status with respect to the common dimension of time. 
Atemporalists, hold that God cannot be temporal so as to undergo succession or 
change. This would mean that God cannot have any sense of existence in or 
experience of the common temporal dimension. God is a different kind of prisoner 
here, being not restricted to time, but being restricted from it. With the same breath 
that atemporalists accuse OSDT of not upholding divine freedom, they would 
themselves restrict God from spatio–temporality. Helm writes, “if God is in time, 
then he is not sovereign over time but is bound by it in precisely the same way as 
we are bound by it. The ever–rolling stream of time not only carries us along with 
it, it carries God along with it as well.” (Helm 2002, 122) A transcendent model of 
divine temporality undercuts Helm’s assumption. God can, in fact, exist in time 
without being bound to it. If Helm were correct about how the occupancy of the 
temporal dimension worked, it would stand to reason that space would work in an 
analogous way, so that a three–dimensional object could not occupy two dimensions 
of space without being restricted to two dimensions of space. This is clearly not the 
case, as demonstrated by our earlier example of the cube and its implications for 
dimensions of time. 
Likewise, the restriction of God to the common dimension of time also impinges 
on God’s freedom. On OSDT’s version of sovereignty, God “cannot undo the 
succession that He freely brought upon Himself, nor can He retrieve His lost 




moments…He cannot do anything that is logically and metaphysically impossible, 
and He is no less sovereign for all that.” (Mullins 2014, 173) This response does avoid 
the prisoner objection if undoing, recurring in, or retrieving moments from 
succession are metaphysically impossible. However, the trans–dimensional model 
of time shows that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, extra spatial dimensions 
are presumed to function in exactly this way with regard to space, as with the 
example Greene gives of the ant in a compactified circular dimension of time. 
(Greene 2011, 204–206) It would not be impossible for a God who is transcendently 
temporal to experience the succession and potential change of time differently than 
his creatures. In a way analogous to the apparent multiple–location of the tesseract 
in three space, God could appear to be simultaneously multiply located with respect 
to the common dimension of time. Such a view has been proposed on accounts of 
the Eucharist, so that the body and blood of Christ broken for the Church are present 
at multiple spatio–temporal locations; namely where and when churches gather to 
take the Lord’s supper. (Pruss 2013, 60–73; Arcadi 2018, 90)17 In the same way that 
the hypercube appears to fold in on itself or extend internally, God could 
analogously appear to his creatures to experience the same moment in succession 
more than once. In terms of the spatial analogies unpacked in this paper, the OSDT 
views I have laid out do in fact restrict God to the same experience of the same 
dimension of time as creatures. God necessarily would experience succession in the 
same order and in the same way as creation does. Both OSDT and divine 
atemporalists, it would seem, make God a prisoner in one respect or another. 
Neither, according trans–dimensional models of spatio–temporality, need to do this 
logically or metaphysically.  
 
The Creator–Creature Distinction in the Experience of Time 
 
The next implication is drawn out of the creator–creature distinction which 
motivates atemporalist accounts of divine sovereignty and freedom. This distinction 
is a way of holding to the difference in ontological status between God and the 
created order. While both exist, and therefore have ontological status, creation exists 
in the ways that it does because God makes it so, and thus cannot be said to have 
exactly the same ontological status as God. God is a se and creation is not. Barth 
describes this distinction as “attesting that the reality of man and of his cosmos is 
not infinite [in contrast to God’s reality], that it is not the One and All of reality, but 
that it has a genuine horizon which cannot be transcended and which cannot be 
 
17 Both of these talk about the possibility of spatial and temporal extension as a way describing 




absorbed in the immanence of that reality, that this horizon…is the divine will and 
utterance and activity.” (Barth 2010, 87) For Barth, this is an ontological distinction 
between God and creation, so that the ontological dependence of creation on God 
implies creaturely finitude. This is different from how, for instance, human creatures 
craft artifacts because artifacts do not continuously rely on their human creators to 
exist in the dimensional ways that they do. All creatures, on the other hand, rely on 
God to exist in the ways that they do. In the dimensional sense of “ontological 
status” being used in this article, artifacts and creatures would have the same 
ontological status because they have the same spatio–temporal dimensional ways of 
existing. What distinguishes God’s ontological status from creation’s is God’s 
inherent lordship over creation, so that it exists in spatio–temporal ways reflective 
of and contingent upon God’s own nature. God’s temporality could not therefore be 
reduced to creaturely temporality because such a creaturely way of existing is 
ontologically dependent on divine temporality. While human beings do not cause 
the artifacts that they make to be three–dimensional versus two–dimensional, God 
makes all created things what they are dimensionally. While distinct, this is 
nonetheless done in the creator–creature relation between God and the world; Barth 
holds to a correspondence between the created order and God’s own being. (Barth 
2010, 87, 94–95) This is precisely what is being described in the ontological 
responsibility for the created order, and specifically time, which OSDT and 
atemporalists both assert.   
While atemporalists assert that God creates time, and is therefore ontologically 
responsible for it, OSDT claims that God creates the world in such a way that it is 
temporally ordered. This temporal ordering, on the OSDT account, is something 
essential within God’s nature, so that God orders the world temporally to reflect his 
own essence. Time simply is God’s own essential order imposed upon creation. This 
seems to conflate the creator’s and creature’s time and experience of temporality, 
with God and humanity experiencing the same time in the exact same way. More 
specifically, God’s experience of temporality on the OSDT account is, as previously 
stated mono–directional succession, exactly as the human creaturely experience of 
time. (Mullins 2014, 173–174) God cannot undo succession or retrieve past moments 
in the exact same way that human creatures are trapped in the successive flow of 
time simply because, according to these accounts, it is metaphysically impossible. If 
no substantial distinction can be drawn between the creaturely experience of time 
and the divine experience of time, then this view is in danger of reducing God’s 
dimensional ontological status to that of creaturely dimensional ontological status. 
As mentioned above, this is intimately linked with God’s lordship over the order of 
creation, and thus the lack of distinction might pose a challenge to God’s lordship 




over time. If, as Greene argues, the only distinction we can make between the 
multiplicity of temporal dimensions is in the psychological experience of 
temporality, then we require some distinction between the creaturely and divine 
experience of time to avoid this collapse.   
Rather than restricting God to (or from) the creaturely experience of the creature’s 
dimension of time, it would make more sense to conceive of God’s transcendence of 
time as distinguished from creaturely temporality in two important respects. Firstly, 
on the trans–dimensional model of space–time, God would not be limited to the 
common dimension of time experienced by creatures in the same way a cube is not 
limited to the two dimensions of space of a square it might occupy. This is already 
well captured in the literature, such as when Padgett writes, “although we are in 
Gods time (and thus God is in our time, too) God transcends our time. He cannot be 
measured by our time, and he does not have to enter into our space–time (although 
he is free to do so, if he wishes).” (Padgett 1989, 214–215) This is reflective of the 
creator–creature distinction, to which T. F. Torrance proposes, “to operate with a 
parallel distinction between created time and uncreated ‘time’, that is, between the 
created time of the universe defined by its contingent nature, and the uncreated 
‘time’ (so to speak) of the eternal life of God defined by his divine nature.” (Torrance 
2015, 50) In this model of transcendent temporality, created time is the common 
dimension of time which God transcends, existing in it but not being limited to it. It 
is the ordered succession God’s creatures’ experience in which we cannot undo, 
recur in, or retrieve moments. Uncreated time is that internal order of God’s own 
being in virtue of which God creates a temporally and spatially ordered world. 
Creaturely time, therefore, corresponds to divine time in the same way three space 
might be said to correspond to four space. This meshes well with the OSDT claim 
concerning time being an internal and necessary concomitant of God’s essence 
according to which he orders creation temporally. However, there must be a 
distinction between these two temporal orders, so that we do not think of our own 
succession as God’s. This is perhaps what OSDT is missing. God’s succession must 
transcend ours, so that while God may indeed have succession, we do not presume 
that our temporal order is exactly God’s temporal order. Whatever it is in his nature 
that our temporality reflects is ontologically distinct from created time in just the 
way that God is ontologically distinct from his creatures. 
While Padgett’s point about transcendence captures this well, it makes a fatal 
error. He claims that God cannot be measured temporally, either in his presence in 
created time nor according to his uncreated time. With respect to creaturely time, 
the trans–dimensional modeling implies that a lower dimension of time can in fact 




time and space really are analogous, and if created time is truly something which 
corresponds to uncreated time, then God’s transcendent occupancy of created time 
would be measurable according to whatever metrics we think possible of created 
time. If God does enter into our time, he does so in a way that we can analogously 
and truly measure according to our temporal categories with the caveat that we are 
neither capturing the fullness of God’s temporality nor that God is experiencing 
created time in the same way we do.  
This is the second respect in which we ought to uphold the creator–creature 
distinction in divine temporality. God would have a different experience of our time, 
not simply his own time. Similar to the way spatial dimensions interact, God’s 
transcendent experience of created time would be measurable in our creaturely 
temporal or tensed terms. This means that God would have measurable succession 
in his life which could be described linearly. For instance, we could coherently and 
truly describe God’s succession if we were to describe a time before Abraham in 
which the second person of the Trinity existed. We could then map onto our linear 
experience of creaturely succession, a time after Abraham wherein the second 
person of the Trinity takes on a human nature, introducing a change into the life of 
God. The succession in God’s life would be coherently and truly described in these 
creaturely temporal terms, or tensed terms, mapping accurately onto creaturely 
linear succession. Another way of putting this is to say that in so far as God occupies 
a given point or interval of our dimensions of time, we can describe God and his 
actions in tensed ways with respect to our experience of succession, such as saying 
“God was with Abraham,” or “God will answer my prayer.” Yet this does not mean 
that God’s experience of that succession or those temporal moments was exactly the 
same as ours, so that God experienced the succession of intervals or points in the 
same order. God’s experience of succession could be out of linear order, or such that 
God experienced those two temporal points in his succession in a simultaneous way. 
This distinction is relative to God’s temporal perspective, so that our creaturely 
temporal language can still map onto God’s actions and occupancy of our time in a 
helpful and true way. Our tensed language of God, therefore, is true with respect to 
our experience of creaturely time. While our creaturely temporal categories cannot 
begin to comprehend exactly what this would mean for divine experience of 
succession, it nonetheless is important to note because it is in virtue of this distinct 
experience of the creaturely dimension of time that we can uphold God’s freedom 
with respect to created time. While we are not free from the “ever rolling–on” of 
time, God in fact is in a way that does not preclude creaturely metrication of God’s 
life, wherein we predicate our linear temporal language of God.  
  




Possible Objections to a Transcendent Temporality 
 
To conclude, I will anticipate two possible objections to transcendent temporality 
constructed on a trans–dimensional model of spacetime. The first objection would 
likely come from divine atemporalists. It runs like this: while it might be well to say 
that God transcends our dimension of time, this model implies that God does so as 
a being who simply exists in a higher dimension of time. God would be a prisoner 
of that dimension rather than our own. There are two possible ways of avoiding this 
objection.  
The first would be to appeal to fact that God has the greatest ontological status of 
anything that exists. If some dimension of time is ontologically distinct from or 
external to God, then God is necessarily ontologically responsible for it. It must, per 
the model in this paper, be a dimension which God can transcend. God can 
transcend any dimension of time that exists externally to himself. In this way, we 
are left with a God who is capable of both experiencing succession and not 
experiencing succession. While this sounds similar to ET–simultaneity, in which 
God is timeless but temporally present so that every moment is simultaneous with 
him, it is in fact different. If one takes all dimensions of time to be external to God, 
then he is temporal in addition to being timeless, so that he would exist both 
temporally and atemporally. In other words, God would experience succession in 
his life, but not every aspect of his life has succession. This is contrary to ET–
simultaneity in which “an eternal God cannot have succession in his life…nothing 
in God’s life can be past or future with respect to anything else, either in God’s life 
or in time.” (Stump 2018, 19) Rather God would have succession in some aspects of 
his life, but not every aspect could be described in terms of temporal succession. On 
this reply, the freedom of God to not have succession (and thus an avoidance of the 
prisoner objection) is maintained in at least some aspect of God’s life being able to 
exist beyond every dimension of time.  
While one could take this tact, it appears to undercut the correlation between 
created temporal order and God’s being. There is no temporality in God’s being in 
virtue of which he creates a temporally ordered world. The second response to this 
objection would be to appeal to OSDT’s defense of time as internal to God’s being, 
thus maintaining this correspondence between divine and created time. This is 
helpful against the modified POT objection because time is internal to God and not 
something independent of him. (Mullins 2014, 172) Thus, God could not be subject 
to it anymore than he could be subject to himself as a se. Where this defense fails for 




transcendent temporality distinguishes these by describing them as (at least) two 
separate dimensions of time. The distinction is maintained as well as the correlation.  
The second objection I anticipate is an objection to divine time being metricated. 
While it is clear how we might conceive of coherently mapping creaturely temporal 
categories onto God’s divine experience of created time, it is a greater leap to map 
creaturely temporal categories onto uncreated time. While I will grant that this is a 
great deal more confusing and that much less could be helpfully said of uncreated 
time in creaturely terms, the trans–dimensional model of spacetime still defends this 
move. Just as we are able to make three–dimensional models of four space, we can 
describe God’s experience of uncreated time in terms of creaturely linear succession. 
Similar to our spatial models, we would be missing temporal information. Likely, 
any description we could give would be significantly abstract. Yet such temporal 
modeling would nevertheless be accurate in its depiction of uncreated time. This 
rests on the assumption that divine time is an extra temporal dimension.  
While transcendent temporality does not resolve the long–standing disagreement 
between divine temporalists and atemporalists, it does better capture this collection 
of underlying theological and philosophical motivations behind OSDT and the POT 
objection. Transcendent temporality upholds the creator–creature distinction better 
than OSDT by distinguishing between uncreated and created time. It better upholds 
divine freedom than either OSDT or the POT objection by distinguishing God’s 
experience of created time from our own, but in such a way that still permits for God 
to exist in our temporal dimension. Finally, it better upholds the authenticity of both 
God’s relation to the spatio–temporal world and the possibility of temporal God–
talk than the POT objection by granting that God could in fact exist according to our 
temporal dimension without being necessarily bound to it. This is done in such a 
way that we can authentically and coherently describe God’s experience of created 
time in our own temporal categories while still recognizing that these are limited 
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